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Research Article
A pervasive bias in learning leads people to change 
their beliefs about their future more readily when con-
fronted with good news compared with bad news 
(Sharot & Garrett, 2016). This bias leads to unrealistic 
optimism, biased self-perceptions, and flawed financial 
predictions (Eil & Rao, 2011; Kuhnen, 2015; Peysakhovich 
& Karmarkar, 2016; Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 1996; 
Sharot, Korn, & Dolan, 2011). For instance, people read-
ily change their beliefs when learning that their chance 
of developing cancer during their lifetime is lower than 
expected but resist updating these same beliefs if they 
learn that their chance of developing cancer is higher 
than expected. This learning bias appears to arise from 
self-enhancing motivations that enable people to 
develop and maintain positive beliefs about themselves 
and their future (Greenwald, 1980; Taylor & Brown, 
1988; Weinstein, 1980). By contrast, depressed people 
(who lack self-enhancing motivations) do not show an 
optimistic learning bias (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn, Sharot, 
Walter, Heekeren, & Dolan, 2014).
In addition to caring about themselves, people also 
care about the welfare of others: family, friends, and 
sometimes even strangers (Engel, 2011; Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2003; Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010). 
Correspondingly, there is evidence that people experience 
vicarious emotions in response to others’ successes and 
misfortunes, as reflected in both self-reports of emotions 
(Goubert et al., 2005; Singer & Klimecki, 2014) and brain 
activity (Morelli, Sacchet, & Zaki, 2015; Ruff & Fehr, 2014; 
Zaki, Wager, Singer, Keysers, & Gazzola, 2016). Impor-
tantly, the intensity of vicarious emotions is linked to the 
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Abstract
An optimistic learning bias leads people to update their beliefs in response to better-than-expected good news but neglect 
worse-than-expected bad news. Because evidence suggests that this bias arises from self-concern, we hypothesized 
that a similar bias may affect beliefs about other people’s futures, to the extent that people care about others. Here, we 
demonstrated the phenomenon of vicarious optimism and showed that it arises from concern for others. Participants 
predicted the likelihood of unpleasant future events that could happen to either themselves or others. In addition 
to showing an optimistic learning bias for events affecting themselves, people showed vicarious optimism when 
learning about events affecting friends and strangers. Vicarious optimism for strangers correlated with generosity 
toward strangers, and experimentally increasing concern for strangers amplified vicarious optimism for them. These 
findings suggest that concern for others can bias beliefs about their future welfare and that optimism in learning is not 
restricted to oneself.
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concern one feels for the other person. For instance, 
people care more about, and experience more vicarious 
(empathic) pain, for a fair person compared with an unfair 
person (Singer et al., 2006) and for in-group compared 
with out-group members (Hein et al., 2010). Here, we 
suggest not only that concern for others leads people to 
vicariously experience negative outcomes for others but 
also that said concern causes people to bias their learning 
about others’ negative outcomes—manifesting as vicarious 
optimism. We predicted that participants would show an 
optimistic bias when learning about the outcomes affect-
ing others they care about, updating their beliefs less in 
response to bad news compared with good news. We 
further predicted that increasing concern for others would 
increase vicarious optimism just as it increases vicarious 
emotional responses to negative outcomes for others 
(Hein et al., 2010; Mathur, Richeson, Paice, Muzyka, & 
Chiao, 2014; Singer et al., 2006).
Previous research suggests that the bias arises from 
a failure to update beliefs following bad news rather 
than from an enhanced updating following good news. 
Updating from good news conforms closely to Bayesian 
inference, whereas updating from bad news is reduced 
compared with normative predictions (Eil & Rao, 2011). 
Moreover, individual differences in optimistic learning 
track more closely with updating from bad news than 
good news (Lefebvre, Lebreton, Meyniel, Bourgeois-
Gironde, & Palminteri, 2017; Moutsiana et  al., 2013; 
Sharot et al., 2011), and interventions that alter opti-
mistic learning affect updating from bad news but not 
good news (Sharot, Guitart-Masip, Korn, Chowdhury, 
& Dolan, 2012; Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012). This suggests 
that increasing concern for others may increase vicari-
ous optimism by reducing updating from bad news.
To test whether people indeed optimistically bias 
their learning about future outcomes for others, we 
adapted an experimental paradigm previously used to 
measure learning about the likelihood of negative future 
events happening to oneself (Kuzmanovic, Jefferson, & 
Vogeley, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011). In our vicarious opti-
mism task, participants estimated the likelihood of 
negative future events happening to another person 
(see Fig. 1). During the task, participants first estimated 
the likelihood of a negative future event happening to 
a target person, specified as either a friend (Study 1) 
or a stranger (Studies 2–4). They were then informed 
about the average likelihood of that event actually hap-
pening to that person. Good news meant that the aver-
age likelihood was lower than the first estimate; bad 
news meant that the average likelihood was higher than 
the first estimate. Participants then estimated the likeli-
hood of the event in question a second time. The dif-
ference between the first and second estimates indicated 
their level of belief updating. Using this paradigm, we 
tested whether participants showed vicarious optimism 
for friends and strangers.
Following past work (Sharot et al., 2011), we mea-
sured participants’ optimistic learning bias using (a) the 
difference in learning rate for good and bad news and 
(b) the difference in updating for good and bad news. 
Learning rates indicate the strength of the relationship 
between the estimation error (i.e., the difference 
between estimated and average likelihood) and the 
subsequent belief update on a trial-by-trial basis; the 
higher the learning rate, the more participants changed 
their beliefs in line with the conflicting evidence they 
received. An optimistic bias in learning rates is indi-
cated by stronger learning rates for good versus bad 
news. Updating, the difference between first and sec-
ond estimates, indicates the amount a belief is updated 
when a person receives conflicting information. An 
optimistic bias in updating indicates that participants 
changed their beliefs more following good versus bad 
news. Given that both indicators were associated with 
the same pattern of results, we report the learning rate 
results here and the update bias results in the Supple-
mental Material available online.
In all of our analyses, we controlled for potential dif-
ferences in estimation errors for good versus bad news 
to ensure that differences in learning for good versus 
bad news did not reflect differences in the initial esti-
mates (i.e., prior beliefs) between conditions or mean 
estimation errors. This also excluded the possibility that 
the results presented below were a statistical artifact 
resulting from skewed base rates at the individual level 
(Garrett & Sharot, 2017). Detailed descriptions of our 
planned analyses as well as the full set of materials, 
including all additional measures, can be found at the 
Open Science Framework (osf.io/6b4ag).
Study 1: Vicarious Optimism in 
Learning About Friends
To test whether vicarious optimism in learning exists, 
we examined whether participants exhibited an opti-
mistic learning bias for their friends as well as for them-
selves. We therefore had participants complete learning 
tasks that concerned outcomes for themselves and one 
of their friends.
Method
Participants. We recruited 83 participants (male = 40, 
female = 43; mean age = 35.96 years, SD = 1.49) online 
via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and compensated 
them for their time in line with the U.S. minimum wage. 
We excluded 12 participants with a score higher than 12 
on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Steer, 
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Ball, & Ranieri, 1996; a score indicating mild depression) 
because depression has been shown to eliminate the 
optimistic learning bias (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 
2014). Participants had to provide at least four valid 
updates after good news and four valid updates after bad 
news, which ensured the reliability of our measures; 3 
participants failed to reach these numbers.
We used G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & 
Lang, 2009) to calculate desired sample sizes. We based 
our power analysis on previous research on the opti-
mistic learning bias (Garrett & Sharot, 2014; Garrett 
et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; 
Moutsiana et  al., 2013; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et  al., 
2012; Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012; Sharot et al., 2011), 
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Fig. 1. Vicarious optimism task. On each trial (a), participants imagined a negative event happening to a target individual (friend or 
stranger), estimated the likelihood of the event happening to the target, learned about the average likelihood for that event, and finally 
reestimated the likelihood. A good-news event (b) was defined by a first estimate that was higher than the average likelihood. The estima-
tion error was then calculated by subtracting the first estimate from the average likelihood, and the update was calculated by subtracting 
the first estimate from the second estimate. The learning rate, which indicated how well the estimation error predicted the subsequent 
update, was the unstandardized regression coefficient indicating the strength of the relationship between the estimation error and the 
subsequent update. A bad-news event (c) was defined by a first estimate that was lower than the average likelihood. The estimation 
error was then calculated by subtracting the average likelihood from the first estimate, and the update was calculated by subtracting 
the second from the first estimate. Again, the learning rate indicated how well the estimation error predicted the subsequent update.
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which found an average effect size (Cohen’s d) of 
valence (good news vs. bad news) on learning of 0.9. 
We expected the valence effect for a friend to be less 
strong than for the self and, hence, estimated a small 
to medium effect size of 0.4. To achieve a power of .90, 
we needed a sample of 67 participants. We expected 
that about 15% of the participants would have a BDI 
score higher than 12 given our previous experience 
with MTurk participants. Hence, we aimed for 85 par-
ticipants to ensure a final sample of about 70 after 
excluding ineligible participants.
Procedure and materials. All participants completed 
the vicarious optimism task for themselves and a friend. 
The order of conditions was randomized so that half the 
participants started with the self condition and the other 
half started with the friend condition. In each condition 
(self and friend), participants saw 30 different short 
descriptions of negative life events (e.g., luggage lost by 
airline) presented in a random order. To rule out the pos-
sibility that observed differences in learning from good 
versus bad news could reflect a statistical artifact (Garrett 
& Sharot, 2017), we used credible feedback for partici-
pants’ estimations, taken from sources such as the Office 
for National Statistics (Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012). 
Second, we ensured that base rates used for feedback 
were normally distributed around the midpoint of the 
scale we used, such that there was equal room for pro-
viding over- and underestimations. The lists of events did 
not include very rare or very common events, and partici-
pants were told that the average likelihood was never 
lower than 3% or higher than 77%. The first list had a 
mean base rate of 36.5 (SD = 17.71, minimum = 10, maxi-
mum = 70), and the second list had a mean base rate of 
35.0 (SD = 17.23, minimum = 10, maximum = 70). Using 
the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality, we found that for both 
lists, the distributions of base rates did not significantly 
differ from normal distributions, ps < .16.
In the self condition, participants were asked to esti-
mate the likelihood of negative life events happening 
to themselves. In the friend condition, participants were 
asked to estimate the likelihood of negative life events 
happening to a friend with the same gender, age, and 
ethnicity as themselves (participants were asked to 
enter the name of the friend into a text box prior to 
starting the trials). The order of conditions did not affect 
the results.
On each trial, a negative life event was presented, 
and participants were asked to imagine this event hap-
pening to themselves or their friend. Then, when the 
words “Estimation of happening?” appeared on the 
screen, participants were prompted to enter the per-
centage likelihood of this event happening to them-
selves or their friend at some point in their lifetime, 
with higher numbers indicating that it was more likely 
that the event would happen. Participants were told 
that they would then see the actual average likelihood 
of this event happening to someone with similar demo-
graphic criteria to themselves or their friend. Finally, 
participants were asked to again indicate the percent-
age likelihood of the negative event happening to them-
selves or their friend; they were instructed to indicate 
what they thought at that moment, regardless of what 
they entered previously.
Participants initially completed a practice session 
with three trials. Participants then estimated and rees-
timated the likelihood of 30 different negative life 
events happening to themselves or their friend (see Fig. 
1). We used two different lists of 30 events (Lists A and 
B). For half the participants, List A was presented in 
the self condition and List B was presented in the friend 
condition; for the other half, the assignment of list to 
condition was reversed. The pairing of list with condi-
tion did not affect the results.
Results
To test for vicarious optimism in learning, we examined 
whether participants exhibited an optimistic learning 
bias for their friends as well as for themselves. We 
examined the learning rate (the unstandardized regres-
sion coefficient indicating the strength of the relation-
ship between the estimation error and the subsequent 
update) for good and bad news for the self and a friend 
using repeated measures analyses of variance, control-
ling for the differences in estimation errors between 
good and bad news for both conditions (see Fig. 2).
Across both good- and bad-news conditions, partici-
pants more readily changed their beliefs about their 
friends (M = 0.51, SE = 0.03) than their beliefs about 
themselves (M = 0.41, SE = 0.03), as indicated by a main 
effect of target, F(1, 66) = 8.84, p = .004, ηp2 = .12. 
Nevertheless, participants showed optimistic learning 
not only for themselves but also for their friends, indi-
cated by a main effect of valence, F(1, 66) = 25.39, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .29, with higher learning rates for good news 
(M = 0.55, SE = 0.04) than for bad news (M = 0.36, 
SE = 0.03). Simple-effects analyses showed that the bias 
in learning rates was significantly greater than zero for 
both the self condition, t(67) = 4.68, p < .001, 95% 
confidence interval (CI) = [0.11, 0.30], and the friend 
condition, t(67) = 3.19, p = .002, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.28]. 
The interaction between valence and target was not 
significant, F(1, 66) = 0.24, p = .62, indicating that the 
size of the optimistic learning bias was similar for the 
self and friend conditions. Overall, 69.1% of participants 
showed an optimistic bias in their learning rates for 
themselves (i.e., the difference between learning from 
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good news and learning from bad news was greater 
than zero), and 63.2% showed an optimistic bias for 
their friend; there was a strong correlation between 
both indices, r(68) = .58, p < .001 (see Fig. S3a in the 
Supplemental Material). Having found that participants 
indeed showed vicarious optimism for another person 
they care about, we next investigated the causal role 
of concern for others in vicarious optimism.
Study 2: Vicarious Optimism Is Greater 
for Identifiable Strangers
In Studies 2a and 2b, we manipulated the concern par-
ticipants had for a stranger and then measured vicarious 
optimism for that stranger. We utilized the identifiability 
effect, whereby people have much greater concern for 
an identifiable person than for an unidentifiable person 
(Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Loewenstein, Small, & Strnad, 
2005). In the identifiable-stranger condition, we pre-
sented participants with a description of a person identi-
fied with a name and picture. In the unidentifiable-stranger 
condition, we presented a separate group of participants 
with the same description without the name and the 
picture. We hypothesized that participants would show 
greater vicarious optimism for an identifiable stranger 
than an unidentifiable stranger. We were also interested 
in how the magnitude of vicarious optimism for an 
identifiable stranger would compare with that for a 
friend: Would people treat strangers more like friends, 
in terms of their vicarious optimism, when those strang-
ers are identifiable?
Method
Participants. In Study 2a, for our main test (the differ-
ence of the valence effect between the identifiable-stranger 
and unidentifiable-stranger conditions), we expected a 
small to medium difference (d = 0.4). We needed 100 
participants per condition for a power of .80. Again, we 
expected that about 15% of the participants on MTurk 
would have a BDI score higher than 12. Hence, we 
recruited 240 participants (mean age = 28.31 years, SD = 
0.51; male = 122, female = 117, other = 1). We excluded 
51 participants with a BDI score higher than 12 and a 
further 16 participants who failed to provide at least 
four valid positive and negative updates on the learning 
task.
For Study 2b, we preregistered the hypothesis, sam-
pling procedures, and analysis plan (https://osf.io/
a5bmw/). To obtain .90 power to detect the effect size 
in the difference between identifiable and unidentifi-
able strangers found in Study 2a, we aimed to recruit 
470 participants after exclusion of participants with a 
BDI score higher than 12. Hence, we collected partici-
pants until we obtained 470 useable participants (mean 
age = 38.57 years [2 missing], SD = 12.51; male = 205, 
female = 265; see the preregistered material for further 
details). Note that we preregistered a different statistical 
analysis plan from that reported below. We report the 
preregistered analyses in the Supplemental Material, 
which produced the same results as reported here.
Procedure. In Study 2a, the learning paradigm con-
tained as within-subjects factors a friend condition (iden-
tical to Study 1) and a stranger condition. Participants 
completed these conditions in random order (condition 
order did not affect the results). For the stranger condi-
tion, participants were further randomly assigned to com-
plete the task for either an identifiable stranger or an 
unidentifiable stranger. Thus, friend versus stranger was 
manipulated within subjects, and identifiable versus 
unidentifiable stranger was manipulated between sub-
jects. In the identifiable-stranger condition, participants 
saw a photograph of an American woman along with a 
name and brief description, such as, “The stranger is 
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Fig. 2. Results from Study 1 (N = 68): mean learning rate as a func-
tion of whether participants received good news versus bad news, 
separately for the self and friend conditions. The learning rate is the 
unstandardized regression coefficient indicating the strength of the 
relationship between the estimation error and the subsequent update. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Asterisks indicate 
significant differences between conditions (p < .05).
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Laura, a 35-year-old female American, pictured below.” 
Participants saw one of three different women, which 
ensured that our manipulation did not depend on a spe-
cific stimulus set. In the unidentifiable-stranger condition, 
participants read the same description of the stranger but 
without the name and the picture: “The stranger is a 
35-year-old female American.” In Study 2b, participants 
were randomly assigned to complete the vicarious opti-
mism task for either an identifiable or an unidentifiable 
stranger (manipulated between subjects).
Results
Participants’ beliefs about their friends were more resistant 
to new information than their beliefs about strangers—
main effect of target: F(1, 167) = 62.49, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.27. We found a three-way interaction between valence, 
target (friend vs. stranger), and identifiability (identifi-
able vs. unidentifiable stranger) on learning rates, F(1, 
167) = 8.24, p = .005, ηp2 = .05, supporting our predic-
tions. Participants showed significantly greater vicarious 
optimism for friends than for unidentifiable strangers, 
F(1, 77) = 7.58, p = .007, but this difference vanished 
when the stranger was identifiable, F(1, 89) = 0.92, p = 
.34. We also found tentative support for the predicted 
two-way interaction between valence and identifiability, 
F(1, 167) = 3.25, p = .073 (see Fig. 3a). Specifically, 
participants tended to show stronger vicarious opti-
mism for the identifiable stranger compared with the 
unidentifiable stranger. In line with this pattern, 74.4% 
of the participants showed an optimistic bias in their 
learning rates for their friend, 68.7% showed an opti-
mistic bias for an identifiable stranger, and 59.2% 
showed an optimistic bias for an unidentifiable stranger. 
Identifiability increased vicarious optimism specifically 
by reducing updating from bad news, t(168) = 3.19, 
p = .002; identifiability did not affect updating from 
good news, t(168) = 1.11, p = .27.
Because the predicted interaction between valence 
and identifiability was only at trend level, we conducted 
a preregistered replication study using a larger sample 
on the basis of the effect size found in Study 2a (osf.io/
a5bmw/). Here, the interaction between valence and 
identifiability was significant, F(1, 467) = 4.38, p = .037, 
ηp2 = .009. As predicted, participants showed greater 
vicarious optimism, as indicated by biased learning 
rates, for the identifiable stranger than for the uniden-
tifiable stranger (see Fig. 3b). Consistent with this find-
ing, a total of 69.9% of the participants showed an 
optimistic bias in their learning rates for an identifiable 
stranger, and 59.2% for an unidentifiable stranger. As in 
Study 2a, identifiability reduced updating from bad news, 
t(468) = 3.17, p = .002, but did not affect updating from 
good news, t(168) = 0.89, p = .37. Thus, increasing 
concern for a stranger by making the stranger identifi-
able increased vicarious optimism for that stranger.
One possible alternative explanation for our finding 
that identifiability increases vicarious optimism is that 
participants may have felt that they had more informa-
tion about the identifiable person (Moore & Small, 2007) 
rather than increased concern for that person. Study 3 
was designed to rule out this alternative explanation.
Study 3: Vicarious Optimism Is Greater 
for Likable Strangers
People show more concern for those they like com-
pared with those they do not like (Fiske, Cuddy, & 
Glick, 2007). Thus, we predicted that manipulating lik-
ability by providing information about others’ moral 
decisions (Siegel, Crockett, & Dolan, 2017) would 
increase vicarious optimism.1 Participants read about 
two strangers who participated in a “Shock Study.” Both 
strangers received £20 and were asked how much they 
would be willing to pay to prevent another person from 
receiving painful electric shocks. The “liked” stranger 
gives £20.00, whereas the “disliked” stranger gives only 
£1.96. Consistent with previous findings (Siegel et al., 
2017), a pilot study showed that participants rated the 
liked stranger higher in likability, but not in health or 
intelligence, than the disliked stranger. Hence, differ-
ences in vicarious optimism between the conditions 
cannot be explained by different perceptions of health 
or intelligence for the liked versus disliked strangers, 
since they did not differ on these dimensions.
Method
Participants. As in Study 2b, we preregistered our 
hypothesis, methods, participant recruitment strategy, 
and analysis before running the studies and analyzing the 
data (osf.io/zmf4c). Our goal was to obtain .90 power to 
detect a small effect size (f  ) of .1 at the standard .05 
alpha error probability; therefore, we aimed to recruit 
280 participants with a BDI score lower than 12 (see the 
preregistered material for further details). We ended up 
recruiting 285 participants (mean age = 36.57 years, SD = 
12.09; male = 132, female = 150, other = 3) via Prolific, a 
crowdsourcing site similar to Amazon MTurk (Peer, 
Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). The study had a 
within-subjects design in which all participants did the 
learning task for the liked and disliked strangers in ran-
domized order.
Procedure and materials. All participants read descri-
ptions of two strangers, presented in randomized order. 
Person Y was the liked stranger, whereas Person X was 
the disliked stranger. In particular, participants read,
Vicarious Optimism 7
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Fig. 3. Results from (a) Study 2a (N = 170), (b) Study 2b (N = 470), and Study 3 (N = 285): mean learning rate as 
a function of whether participants received good versus bad news. Results are shown separately for the friend, 
identifiable-stranger, and unidentifiable-stranger conditions (Study 2a); the identifiable- and unidentifiable-stranger 
conditions (Study 2b); and the liked- and disliked-stranger conditions (Study 3). The learning rate is the unstandard-
ized regression coefficient indicating the strength of the relationship between the estimation error and the subse-
quent update. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Asterisks indicate significant differences between 
conditions (p < .05).
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Imagine Person X [Y] is participating in an 
experiment. The experimenter gives Person X [Y] 
£20. The experimenter then asks how much of 
this money they would be willing to pay to prevent 
another person from getting 10 painful electric 
shocks. Person X [Y] responds that they are willing 
to pay £1.96 [£20] to prevent another person from 
getting 10 painful electric shocks.
To ensure that the only difference participants per-
ceived between the strangers was their willingness to 
help another person to avoid pain, we informed them 
that “for this Shock Study, we screened participants very 
carefully so that participants had the same health and 
intelligence.” Thereafter, we explicitly told participants 
that this meant that Person X and Person Y have the 
same level of intelligence and health. Participants finally 
had to indicate that they understood that both strangers 
had the same levels of intelligence and health. Then, 
participants completed the vicarious optimism task for 
the liked and the disliked strangers in randomized 
order. For each, they first read the description of the 
stranger and, thereafter, completed the corresponding 
vicarious optimism task.
In a pilot study, another set of participants (N = 40) 
rated both strangers (liked and disliked) on likability 
(likability, generosity, warmth, blameworthiness, moral-
ity, friendliness; see the Supplemental Material for factor 
analyses confirming one general-likability dimension) 
as well as intelligence and health. Using paired-samples 
t tests, we found a main effect of stranger (liked vs. 
disliked) on the likability dimension, t(39) = 7.79, p < 
.001, but not on intelligence, t(39) = 0.75, p = .45, or 
health, t(39) = 1.43, p = .16. Participants rated the liked 
stranger as more likable than the disliked stranger, but 
they rated both as similarly intelligent and healthy.
Results
We found the expected main effect of valence, F(1, 282) = 
64.61, p < .0001, ηp2 = .18; no main effect of person, 
F(1, 282) = .003, p = .95; and the predicted interaction 
effect between valence and likability, F(1, 282) = 50.73, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .15. Participants showed a stronger bias 
in learning rates for the liked stranger (mean bias = .26, 
SE = .022) compared with the disliked stranger (mean 
bias = .07, SE = .019). In line with this pattern, 72.6% 
of the participants showed an optimistic bias in their 
learning rates for the liked stranger, and 50.5% showed 
an optimistic bias for the disliked stranger. Consistent 
with Studies 2a and 2b, likability reduced updating from 
bad news, F(1, 283) = 36.52, p < .001. In addition, lik-
ability increased updating from good news, F(1, 283) = 
48.14, p < .001. Thus, even though participants’ impres-
sions of the two strangers did not differ in terms of 
health or intelligence, participants were more optimistic 
in their learning about the future of the liked stranger 
who was willing to give all the received money to help 
a fellow stranger, compared with the disliked stranger, 
who was willing to give only a meager amount of 
money to prevent harm to another.
Study 4: Vicarious Optimism in 
Learning About Strangers Predicts 
Altruistic Behavior
In our final study, we examined whether we could 
predict prosocial behavior from individual levels of 
vicarious optimism. We first measured participants’ 
vicarious optimism for a stranger and subsequently 
their generosity toward similar strangers. Because con-
cern for others predicts prosocial behavior such as 
donations (Verhaert & Van den Poel, 2011), we rea-
soned that the stronger participants’ vicarious optimism 
for an American stranger (indicating the concern they 
feel for the stranger’s outcomes), the more money they 
would donate to American strangers in need.
Method
Participants. We expected the valence effect for 
stranger on learning to be small to medium (d = 0.4). To 
achieve a power of .90, we needed a sample of 67 par-
ticipants, and for a medium correlation (r = .3) between 
learning bias and charity donation, we needed 80 partici-
pants per condition for a power of .80. Hence, we aimed 
for 100 participants to have a final sample of about 80 
after excluding ineligible participants; 95 participants 
completed the study (mean age = 35.55 years, SD = 1.55; 
male = 43, female = 52). We excluded 18 participants 
with a BDI score higher than 12 and 4 participants who 
failed to reach at least four valid positive and negative 
updates on the learning task.
Procedure and materials. Participants completed the 
vicarious optimism task for themselves and a stranger in 
randomized order. To ensure that during the stranger 
task participants were thinking about a single person 
rather than an undefined group of people, we prompted 
them to think of a stranger with the same gender, age, 
and ethnicity as themselves and to come up with and 
enter a name for the stranger.
After finishing both the self and stranger tasks, par-
ticipants were given the opportunity to donate to char-
ity. They received a bonus of $1 and then learned about 
the American Cancer Society, an organization dedicated 
to helping American people with cancer. Thereafter, 
participants indicated how many cents out of their $1 
bonus—if any—they wanted to donate to the American 
Cancer Society.
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Results
Again, participants’ beliefs about themselves were more 
resistant to new information than their beliefs about 
others—main effect of target, F(1, 74) = 45.89, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .38. However, people showed optimism for both 
themselves and strangers—main effect of valence, F(1, 
74) = 12.75, p = .001, ηp2 = .15—with learning rates for 
good news (M = 0.67, SE = 0.03) being stronger than 
for bad news (M = 0.54, SE = 0.03). Simple-effects analy-
ses showed that, across all participants, the bias in 
learning rates was significantly greater than zero for the 
self, t(75) = 4.5, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.10, 0.24], and for 
the stranger, t(75) = 2.61, p = .01, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.15]. 
Nevertheless, we observed pronounced individual dif-
ferences in the degree of vicarious optimism for strang-
ers, with about half of participants (56.4%) showing an 
optimistic learning bias and the other half showing a 
pessimistic learning bias (i.e., a learning rate bias score 
less than zero). For the self, in contrast, 68.4% showed 
an optimistic learning bias. The learning bias for the 
self condition and the learning bias for the stranger 
condition were not significantly correlated, r(76) = .10, 
p = .386 (see Fig. S3b in the Supplemental Material).
Strikingly, we found that participants with an opti-
mistic learning bias for strangers donated on average 
almost 3 times as much to charity as participants with 
a pessimistic learning bias for strangers, t(74) = 2.26, 
p = .026 (see Fig. 4). Individual differences in the mag-
nitude of vicarious optimism for strangers were posi-
tively correlated with donations to charity, r(76) = .26, 
p = .02 (see Fig. S4b in the Supplemental Material). This 
relationship was robust to controlling for the magnitude 
of the optimistic learning bias for self, age, gender, 
education, and income, partial r(70) = .29, p = .012 (see 
the Supplemental Material for details).
To test whether donations to charity were predicted 
by reduced updating from bad news, enhanced updat-
ing from good news, or both, we regressed donation 
amount against the learning rates for bad and good 
news. Age, gender, education, and income were included 
as control variables. In line with our previous results, 
results showed that learning from bad news negatively 
predicted donation amount, β = −0.29, p = .02. In addi-
tion, learning from good news positively predicted 
donation amount, β = 0.27, p = .03. Thus, our results 
demonstrate that participants’ vicarious optimism for a 
stranger is correlated with their altruistic behavior 
toward similar strangers. Future research is needed to 
determine the exact mechanism, testing, for instance, 
whether this relationship between vicarious optimism 
and prosocial behavior is caused by general individual 
differences in empathy or target-specific mechanisms 
such as similarity or shared group membership.
Discussion
We showed that the concern people feel for others can 
lead to vicarious optimism. Manipulating the degree of 
concern for a stranger, by making that person identifi-
able or more likable, correspondingly increased vicari-
ous optimism for the stranger. Feeling that one knows 
more about an identifiable compared with an uniden-
tifiable stranger cannot explain these results, because 
in Study 3, we provided the same amount of informa-
tion about a liked and a disliked stranger, and partici-
pants still showed a substantially stronger bias for the 
likable stranger, supporting our hypothesis that concern 
drives vicarious optimism. Furthermore, the degree of 
vicarious optimism for strangers was predictive of altru-
istic behavior toward similar strangers. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that optimism is not restricted to 
learning about one’s own future outcomes and that 
vicarious optimism indexes concern for others.
What makes participants more vicariously optimistic 
in their learning for identifiable and liked strangers, 
relative to unidentifiable and disliked strangers: 
enhanced updating from good news or reduced updat-
ing from bad news? Consistent with findings showing 
that manipulations of optimistic learning reduce updat-
ing from bad news (Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012; 
Sharot, Kanai, et  al., 2012), our results showed that 
increasing concern for others via identifiability and lik-
ability reduced updating from bad news. In addition, 
we found that likability enhanced updating from good 
news. These findings suggest that different types of 
concern might affect vicarious optimism through par-
tially distinct mechanisms, yet more research is needed 
to systematically test this idea.
Whereas we demonstrated that optimistic learning 
extends to learning about others, our studies also 
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Fig. 4. Results from Study 4 (N = 76): mean donation amount as 
a function of participants’ learning rate bias. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. The asterisk indicates that the difference 
between conditions was significant (p < .05).
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showed a difference in the way that beliefs about the 
self and about others are updated, a difference that is 
rational rather than biased. When comparing learning 
for the self with learning for others, we found that 
participants were more reluctant to change their beliefs 
about themselves than to change their beliefs about a 
friend or a stranger, indicated by higher learning rates 
for others compared with the self. Because people have 
richer and more reliable information about themselves 
than about others, from a rational (Bayesian) perspec-
tive, they should be more reluctant to change their 
beliefs about themselves than about others because the 
former are more precise than the latter (Nassar et al., 
2012). Thus, learning about others, as captured by our 
vicarious learning paradigm, was not only characterized 
by biased processing of good versus bad news but also 
reflected rational aspects of integrating new information 
into the beliefs about oneself, friends, and strangers.
Optimism is a self-centered phenomenon in which 
people underestimate the likelihood of negative future 
events for themselves compared with others (Weinstein, 
1980). Usually, the “other” is defined as a group of aver-
age others—an anonymous mass. When past studies 
asked participants to estimate the likelihood of an event 
happening to either themselves or the average popula-
tion, participants did not show a learning bias for the 
average population (Garrett & Sharot, 2014). These find-
ings are unsurprising given that people typically feel 
little concern for anonymous groups or anonymous 
individual strangers (Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Loewenstein 
et  al., 2005). Yet people do care about identifiable 
others, and we accordingly found that people exhibit 
an optimistic learning bias for identifiable strangers 
and, even more markedly, for friends. Our research 
thereby suggests that optimism in learning is not 
restricted to oneself. We see not only our own lives 
through rose-tinted glasses but also the lives of those 
we care about.
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